This report is part of the RAND Corporation Research report series. This research was sponsored by the United States Air Force and conducted by the Strategy and Doctrine Program within RAND Project AIR FORCE. However, these capabilities also come with serious risks that will need to be managed, and the United States will not have a monopoly on access to them.forces to identify and target substate adversaries more effectively. qualitative advantages in conventional warfare and provide capabilities to process data in ways that enable U.S. maintain superiority if it can leverage these technologies effectively. As aggressive states arm individuals and groups in regions they seek to destabilize or annex, the weaker states will have difficulty containing the violence that results and likely will turn to the United States for support.ĭevelopments in military applications of artificial intelligence might help the U.S.
The use of substate actors as proxy fighters in gray-zone strategies will continue weakening the state's monopoly on violence in many areas of the world.States' monopoly on violence could weaken forces will need to contend with those adversaries' large but less-sophisticated forces. They will have selected asymmetric capabilities to deter U.S.Iran and North Korea do not have-and are unlikely to develop-capabilities to match those of the United States and its regional allies.Iran and North Korea are also likely to employ gray-zone tactics in pursuit of their regional objectives.Despite the leveling playing field, China and Russia likely will prefer to achieve their objectives with the least cost in international reproach and the lowest risk of provoking military conflict with the United States.If wars result, they will be multidomain conflicts fought under an ever-present risk of nuclear escalation. These great-power states might calculate that the United States lacks sufficient capacity-in some cases, the capability-to respond effectively.conventional forces reduced in size, China-and, to a lesser extent, Russia-will narrow the qualitative gap. The risks of war over the next ten to 15 years will largely derive from perceptions of shifts in regional correlations of force.
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